

Policy Changes and Reason Analysis of Bureaucratization of Native Officers in Guizhou in Qing Dynasty

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Abstract

Throughout the whole Qing Dynasty, there had been great twists and changes of the bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou area—with the changes in military and political situations, it had gone through several different policy periods of appeasement in Shunzhi period, the active flow-changing of Wu Sangui, resumption of conciliatory policy in Kangxi period, the comprehensive and all-dimensional native officers bureaucratization in Yongzheng period and the policy rehabilitation of Koreans, Miao nationalities and frontier in Qing Dynasty. As the important strategic pivot, the policy changes of bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou stands for an epitome for the minority policy at borders under the domination of central regime for the great unity, the changing reasons of which are not only closely related with the objective military and political situations, but also related with the ruling styles of the emperors themselves. The national strategies of the mainland-frontier integration of Qing Dynasty were constant; the phased policy changes of bureaucratization of native officers were only different in manners and measures. It is just in this phased changes and gradually forwarding process that the bureaucratization of Guizhou realized the general goal of matching politics, economics and culture with the mainland.

Key words: Bureaucratization of native officers; Policy change; Reason analysis; Objective requirement; economics and culture

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INTRODUCTION

From Ming Dynasty, the Chieftain system fell into serious conflicts with the central government, making the bureaucratization of native officers the objective requirement of the central government under great unity. The chieftains in Guizhou enjoyed great power and strength, so the process of bureaucratization was the most twisted one: the three climaxes in Guizhou—abolishing two Pacification Offices in Sizhou and Sinan during the reign of Yongle, calming down the Pacification Office in Bozhou during the reign of Wanli and abolishing Song Chieftain at the east bank of the local river during the reign of Chongzhen, which abolished three of the four Chieftains (Tian, Yang, An and Song); the regional bureaucratization of native officers during the years of Longqing and Zhengtong had abolished some chiefs, pacification officers and chieftains, some of which were changed into counties and some were under the control of prefectures and weisuo though reserving the Chieftains system. Although the An Chieftain was still in Xuanwei Pacification Office at the west bank of the local river, his power was greatly undermined. Except the original territory (Miao Territory) in Guizhou, other chieftains were not powerful enough to contend with the central government, which also laid the foundation for the large-scaled and full-dimensional bureaucratization of officers in Qing Dynasty.

After the forces of Qing Dynasty entering Guizhou, the process of bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou can be classified into five phases.

1. THE CONCILIATORY POLICY IN EARLY SHUNZHI PERIOD

In late Ming and early Qing Dynasties, several political forces in Guizhou intertwined. 16 years ago in Shunzhi period, the current Guizhou region served as the frontiers fighting against Qing forces of Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang in Daxi military under the regime of Yongli in Southern Ming Dynasty. In the cruel military battles, the conciliatory policy had been unanimously adopted no matter for Li Dingguo or other subordinated Manchu nobility. On 19th January 1659 of Shunzhi period, the imperial edict for Doni, General of Anyuanjingkou, Wu Sangui, General of Pingxi and Zhao Butai, General of Zhengnan read like:

The south has not been pacified, so I specially appoint you to crusade Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, etc.. All the chieftains and people there are my subjects and civilians. Since the insurgences of the invaders, you are afflicted; I feel pity on. Now that the military is dispatched there, conciliate those who want to come over and never offend their belongings; at the same time, tell soldiers not to plunder; those who have contributed must get rewarded by money of official positions. You can copy these edicts and disseminate so that the chieftains and civilians fully understand my order.¹

On 21st January 1659 in Shunzhi period, Hong Chengchou, great secretary for operation had reported to the court:

An Kun, pacification superintendent of Shuixi had surrendered; refer to the attached version.²

On 11th August 1659 in Shunzhi period, Wu Sangui reported again that An Zhongsheng, Wusa local military and civilian government as well as Tao Dou, Jingdong local government in Yunnan.³

On 16th September 1659 in Shunzhi period, he ordered the native officials to report the pedigree, record and the number of offspring for registration with the Chief Secretary, which would be reported to the court for auditing.⁴

For the Qing government at this period, it didn't fulfill the national unity for its main rival was the Yongli regime of South Ming. After weighing the priorities, it was necessary to treat the native official in a moderate way: They would be given preferential treatment only they would surrender. This was also determined by the political and military situations at that time.

2. FLOW CHANGING OF SHUOXI BY WU SANGUI

On 25th January 1659 of Shunzhi period, Wu entered Kunming and emperor Yongli fled toward Yongchang and exiled to Myanmar, so Qing army quickly occupied the whole province of Yunnan. However, the generals of South Ming like Li Dingguo and Bai Wenxuan still owned some forces at that time; the native officials in Yunnan and Guizhou appeared to surrender, but plotted with Yongli and adopted a watch-and-see attitude. In order to stabilize Yunnan and Guizhou as soon as possible, on 22th October 1659, Shunzhi issued an edict to the Ministry of Official Personal Affairs and Ministry of War to order Wu Sangui suppress Yunnan. All the civil or military officials, whether sagacious or not, were chosen and impeached; the right and errors in civil society were upheld or eradicated in reforms; all the affairs related with militants, horses, money and food were be managed by the vessel state. On 22nd December 1661, Qing government ordered Wu again to manage all kinds of affairs of civil and military affairs based on the regulations of Yunnan. Up till then, Wu was placed on the political stage of southwestern regions in turmoils, becoming the master of this region. After controlling this area, Wu immediately began the bureaucratization movement of the native officials.

At this time, Wu had implemented the bureaucratization of native officials in Shuixi, Manai, Wusa and other regions in Guizhou; There are three reasons for it:

Firstly, eradicate the residual forces of chieftains left from Ming Dynasty. Qing had eradicated the hidden hazards to prevent Li Dingguo and his subjects from launching accidents.

After the Qing army entering Yunnan, the stability of Yunnan and Guizhou depended on the forces of the chieftains. The residue of the bureaucratization of native officials in Ming Dynasty—An family in Shuixi—had gained rather considerable forces. Under the strategies of “not sparing to offer high positions and money for encouragement”⁵ to the surrendered chieftains, An Kun had surrendered, becoming the pacification superintendent in a justifiable way. At this time, the fast developing Pumingsheng, chieftain of Amizhou and Sha Yuan, Chieftain of Annan had returned fast and was given official position for hereditary. However, the surrender of the chieftains was forced by the strong Qing army. The unstable situations in southwestern regions had made these two chieftains harbor evil plans, so there were upheavals at any time. An Kun, chieftain of Shuixi saw that “the national military had not fully stationed here, and their forces were weak, so he had planned

¹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu's Veritable Records* Book 122, pp.15-16.

² Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu's Veritable Records* Book 122, p.16.

³ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu's Veritable Records* Book 126, p.22.

⁴ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu's Veritable Records* Book 27, p.11.

⁵ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu's Veritable Records* Book 122, p.15.

something”.⁶ In particular, chieftain She An and chieftain Shapu had a history of starting the rebellion during the reign of Chongzhen; in addition, the forces of Li Dingguo had not fully been eradicated and dominated the border between China and Myanmar. The chieftain forces and the residual forces from South Ming Dynasty had echoed with each other, so there was a great possibility that they would coordinate, which would pose a great threat to Qing Dynasty. For example, Lv Hongyang, subordinate of Zheng Chenggong, hid in Shuixi so as to launch an upheaval so as to respond to Li Dingguo. When An Qing fought against Qing, he also held the banner of Li Dingguo, Emperor Jin of South Ming. Under this kind of situation, Wu Sangui continued to chase after the residues of Li Dingguo and Yongli Emperor; on the other hand, he began a large-scaled bureaucratization of native officers in Shuixi, etc..

Secondly, ensure the smoothness of the channel to Yunnan. Guizhou is important in geographical location, leading to the strategic channel of Yunnan. A large dispatch of militants in southwest posed a great problem of food in the background. When Hong Chengchou led three military troops to Yunnan, he worried that “when they step on Guizhou, the Miao people would intercept at the mountain, or break the way or prevent us from going ahead, so we don’t have enough food for them.” If we dispatch a few militants, we may be raided by the local people, so it is easy to fall into a dilemma,⁷ which made it difficult to transfer food. The latter situations proved what Hong Chengchou said. In 1st month of lunar calendar of Shunzhi period, Bian Sanyuan said:

Guizhou province played an important role, which really stands for the key convergent road of five provinces. It goes with the trend that food and reimbursement all go to that place; besides, the famish of that year makes miscreants of Miao revolt. Huangsi of Pingyue office had been robbed of food and other perks; at the same time, the road to the mountains were frequently plundered.⁸

That is to say that there was food plundering from Miao people around Huangsiduo region. Under this kind of situation, it was imperative to ensure the smooth transportation of the courier route so as to ensure the ample food for soldiers and the security logistics. Therefore, Wu Sangui needed to firstly wipe out the obstacles from a chieftain, chieftain from Wusa and chieftain from Manai. On 2nd August 1660 in Shunzhi period, Wu Sangui reported to the court:

An Kun has been plotting for a long time. He heard that the recent punishment would sacrifice for the ghost to stage revolt. Considering that Shuixi and Manai as the key road of

military, so they allowed no blocking. Adopting the preemptive strategy, the subject had better suppress as early as possible so as to wipe away the hidden danger of Qing Dynasty. What’s more, AnZhong, chieftain of Wusa harbored evil intents, so it was better to suppress them to spread the national greatness. Therefore, they got the edict: councilor, beyle (a rank of the Manchu nobility below that of the prince) and subjects come soon for discussion.⁹

On 8th November 1660 in Shunzhi period, the political subjects replied Wu Sangui:

An Kun, chieftain of Shuixi, Long Jizhao, chieftain of Manai and An Zhongsheng, etc have obeyed on appearance but plotted in the dark. Manage according to request: Carefully plotting and destroying them by waiting for the right moment.¹⁰

Thirdly, realize the political ambition of Wu Sangui of being the king in the southwest. Wu Sangui had been proved to be a speculator in the political stage at the end of Ming and in early Qing Dynasty. After Wu surrendering to Qing government, he had full knowledge of the historical experience of the outcome of last struggling in the process of chasing Yongli emperor of South Ming Dynasty. He knew that the Qing government would not fully trust him, so he actively surrenders and absorbs the rebellions to expand his forces; on the other hand, he also sought to protect himself. Therefore, Wu had begged Hong Chengchou as follows:

Sangui asked about the self-consolidating strategy; Chengchou said: Do not make middle of Yunnan free from troubles. Sangui bears that in mind.¹¹

The emperor can’t bear to have another king to be around him, therefore, the existence of chieftains posed a great threat and obstacle. In order to dominate southwest, fight for the advantages bargaining with Qing royal court and realize its largest political interests, the bureaucratization also served as the necessary steps for Wu Sangui to realize his dream of “being the king in southwest”. Although these had done some derailments, Wu Sangui made a fuss about them, which served as the important factors of exacerbating the situations. On 7th January 1683, Cai Yurong, general superintendent had reported the matter of chieftains, which goes like:

The hereditary matters of chieftains sound plausible. In the past when Wu did not stage a revolt, he harbored hatred to suppress Shuixi and annihilate An Kun. His wife had fled to Wumeng with rest of his subjects and later gave birth to An Shizong, who is still young now. I can observe the differences between people in Pingyue, Qianxi, Weining and Dading. Chieftain demonstrating has made it convenient.¹²

⁶ Notice of Bian Sanyuan-the Governor of Guizhou, *Historical Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties* series A, Book. 5

⁷ Secret Notice of Hong Chengchou-A High Official, *Historical Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties*, series A, Book. 6

⁸ Notice of Bian Sanyuan-the Governor of Guizhou, *Historical Documents of Ming and Qing Dynasties*, series C, Book 10.

⁹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records* Book 139, p.22.

¹⁰ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizu’s Veritable Records* Book 141, p.3.

¹¹ Cangbianshanqiao: *Wu Sangui Die for Rebellion*.

¹² Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu’s Veritable Records* Book 106, pp.18-19.

Fouthly, amass the finances and military forces for anti-Qing movement.

(Sangui) took the initiative to suppress the revolts by the chieftains of Shuixi. On appearance, he pioneered the land; but he employed these advantages for his own good.¹³

Kangxi also said when recalling the affairs of the chieftain in Shuixi:

During the reign of Shunzhi, Li Dingguo safeguarded the steep and dangerous places. Wu Sangui advanced from Shuixi and occupied Yunnan. Therefore, he knew that silver was produced there; he reported that he would suppress Shuixi.¹⁴

The wealth and storage accumulated for hundreds of years by chieftains all went to Wu Sangui¹⁵ through fighting in Shuixi regions. Wu Sangui had accumulated enough material bases for anti-Qing Dynasty, which also made a relatively full preparation for latter uprising. At the same time, Wu also paid great attention to recruit and train the strong and brave soldiers from Miao people. Wu often led them to charge forward in the revolt of three feudatories. Sun Wanxiong, the Korean envoy, was dispatched by Wu to inquire about the situation in Beijing reported to the emperor of Korea:

The gate keepers were asked about the matters by Wu Sangui, and they said...he owned a troop of army (i.e. Servants in Miao territory) daring not to die. Their teeth are the same color with their knees and their eyes are profound and black; they are good at employing swords and brave enough to intimidate the enemies.¹⁶

After approved by Qing court, Wu surrounded Chieftain in Manai when other chieftain forces had not acted: "He attacked them for over 70 days to break their villages and cut down their good omens"¹⁷ so as to pacify the chieftain in Manai. In 1664, the Qing court ordered Wu to dispatch the militants in Yunnan and Guizhou to invade Shuixi from east and west. On 28th March 1665 of Kangxi period, Wu Sangui reported:

Li Shiyao, general, occupied Shuixi of Wumeng in November; An Kun came to occupy on knowing this. Our militants have chased to Boluoqing and Faditun, getting An Kun and settling the local people.¹⁸

On 31st March 1665, Wu Sangui reported that the militants and soldiers had came forward to Wusa and arrested chieftains An Zhongsheng and An Zhongqian.¹⁹

After pacifying the Shuixi revolt, Wu Sangui continued to pacify the revolts by chieftains in Yunnan; and at the

same time, he reported to implement the bureaucratization of native officers in Shuixi. On 9th July 1665, the Ministry of Official Personal Affairs had ratified it.²⁰ On 6th March 1666, set the previous place of chieftain An Kun as Pingyuan government, Dafang as Dading government, Shuixi as Qianxi government and La county as Pingyuan county.²¹ On 11th October 1666, it changed chieftain government of Wusa as Weining government, which was under the control of Guizhou province.²²

Up till then, the bureaucratization of native officials in Shuixi regions had basically completed. Wu had conducted the initial bureaucratization in Shuixi regions, though limited in terms of scale; it indeed eradicated the largest chieftain forces in Guizhou, which laid foundation for the comprehensive bureaucratization during Yongzheng period.

3. RESUMPTION OF CONCILIATORY POLICY IN KANGXI PERIOD

After Kangxi palliating the turmoils, he made great policy adjustments to the bureaucratization in southwest (including Guizhou) and resumed the conciliatory policy to the chieftains in early Qing Dynasty.

On 9th March, 1686, Kangxi released an edict: Recently, the governor of Yungui and the inspectors of Sichuan and Guangxi all reported to suppress the chieftains. I have been considering that it is better to pacify them rather than cause trouble.²³

There are three reasons for Kangxi to adopt the conciliatory policy on Southwestern chieftains:

Firstly, after palliating turmoils and retrieving Taiwan, emperor Kangxi mainly focused on north; he had led many troops to pacify the activities destroying the national unity; the 50 years' efforts by Yongzheng and Qianlong had solved the problems of northern border. What's more, Russia had expanded to the northwestern regions in Kangxi period, posing a practical threat to realise the boarder stability in Qing Dynasty. Therefore, the bureaucratization of native officials in Yunnan and Guizhou regions had not been put on the preliminary agenda.

Secondly, in late Kangxi period, he was troubled to almost demise by the thrones conflicts, which consumed much his forces; he was also in bad health, so he had no time to manage the chieftain problems in southwestern border. Even when the "evading Jungar and saving Tibet"

¹³ *Strategy to Squash the three rebellions* book 1, see *Imperial Collection of Four*, Book 354, p. 6.

¹⁴ *Kang Xi Qi Ju Zhu*, p.1972.

¹⁵ Liu Jian. *Ting Wen Lu*, Book 4, *Despotism of Separatism Regime*.

¹⁶ Wu Hanji. *Chinese Historical Materials in Li's Veritable Records of North Korea*, Book 10, p.4044.

¹⁷ *Ting Wen Lu*, Book 474, *Biography of Wu Sangui*.

¹⁸ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 14, p.12.

¹⁹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 14, p.12.

²⁰ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 15, p.15.

²¹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 18, p.7.

²² Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 20, p.3.

²³ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 124, pp.16-17.

war broke out, Kangxi mainly adopted the conciliatory policy in southwestern regions.

Third, emperor Kangxi had been kind to the surrendered subjects and civilians, so did the chieftain problem. On 6th January 1683, Cai Yurong, general superintendent of Yunnan and Guizhou wrote to the emperor:

Han people are not allowed to sell leads, saltpeter and sulfur to Yi people. They got the edict: Many chieftains make a living by bows and spears; if all these are forbidden, all of them will lose sustenance. If the ruler does not love his civilians and mistreat them, civilians can also topple him by hand. Nine ministers have discussed about this.²⁴

The political character of Kangxi can be seen from the words above. Especially in Kangxi period, Under the guidance of “it is better to eradicate a hidden danger rather than to do good”, he became accustomed to the current situations and adopted the attitudes of understanding and tolerance to the social reality, which can be seen from his words below:

It is the blessing that this place is in peace. (Kang, Qi, & Zhu, 1991, January 23)

Of course, adopting the conciliatory policy didn't mean that Kangxi didn't realize the perils brought by chieftains. In order to restrict the expanding chieftain forces, Kangxi adopted the methods of segmenting the land and demoting the positions, which was the flexible employment of the undermining the vassal states, which stipulated that the chieftains must: Those ordinary people who are competent can apply the officers (second but last level); they can administrate these lands, being regarded as one third or one fifth of those local officers.²⁵

At the same time, most the military offices and institutions containing the unstable factors in Guizhou had been incorporated in government offices, magistrates and counties,²⁶ further creating conditions were created for in-depth implementation of the bureaucratization of native officers.

4 . C O M P L E T I O N O F BUREAUCRATIZATION OF NATIVE OFFICIALS

During the large-scaled bureaucratization of native officials in Yongzheng period, Guizhou also completed the political institutions matching the central plains, which laid the basic picture of current Guizhou Province.

There are three reasons for this large-scaled, top-

²⁴ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shengzu's Veritable Records* Book 106, p.18.

²⁵ *Da Qing Hui Dian. Tu Guan*, Book 7.

²⁶ (Qianlong) Guizhou History Book 1. (2008). Development Inspection of Guizhou Province, reference in Political Geography and Social Environment in Yunnan and Guizhou Area of Early and Middle Qing Dynasty. *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, (4).

down, comprehensive and radical bureaucratization in Yongzheng period.

4.1 The Political Demand For National Politics

In order to achieve this, the nationwide reforms and measures like bureaucratization of native officers, sharing man taxation into fields and civilians and militants working side by side had been fully implemented, which also served as the great background for the bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou.

The legitimacy of Yongzheng as an emperor is still a topic under much contention. Yongzheng also couldn't dispel it, therefore he wrote a passage to defend himself. In early Yongzheng period, the political situations was in a turmoil, and Yongzheng needed to contribute to set up his authority after wiping out the Nian Gengyao and Long Keduo, two obdurate subjects and the insidious 8th prince, so he just gave full play to his ambitions and abilities in and out of the court.

On 28th January 1727 of Yongzheng period, he released an edict to the military department:

For a long time, all chieftains of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangxi and Hubei have done evil at the border and harmed the local places; they plunder, contend and kill each other; the places they have embarked on are plagued by their dirty dealings and killings. I order you to plan elaborately and bureaucratic the local officers. Considering that the poor people at the borders are my people; I want them to get rid of poverty and lead a happy and security life. In addition, it is conducive to pioneer the abandoned land; and at the same time, it can also increase our land.²⁷

Although the truth was not like what Yongzheng had said (the suggestions of Ertai were aimed at “increasing taxes and pacifying” (Ertai, 1992)), these telling and tentative words by him had clearly indicated the initial causes for the bureaucratization, in which the political factors exceeded the real economic interests.

4.2 Adjustments of Military Strategies

The military threats during Yongzheng period mainly came from the northwestern part. Qinghai at early time and Jungar at later time experienced turmoils all day long. Learn from the historical lessons of Southern Song being besieged from Yunnan by people from Mongolia and Yuan Dynasty, Yongzheng branched out the army in two columns; at the same time, he also adopted the measures of bureaucratization for native officials in southwestern regions, which was also the strategic military adjustment in frontier. After the war of “Expelling Jungar and Saving Tibet” in Kangxi Period, Qing Dynasty continued to be in a confrontation with Jungar which was active in eastern Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; at the same time, it was closely related with Mongolia Shuo, so the southern west regions had become the key areas for fighting. With

²⁷ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizong's Veritable Records* Book 64, pp.20-22.

the development of the war situation in northwest, the auxiliary strategic status of the bureaucratization of native officials in southwestern regions had changed to the important strategic defending regions.

In early Yongzheng period, in order to resume his control in Tibet and Qinghai region, Luobuzangdanjin, the chieftain of Heshuote Mongolia alluded the surrounding tribes to make alliances in the first summer of Yongzheng period when changing emperors and General Ying Ti came back to capital for the funerals of parents (Wang, 1989); he had “conspired with Alabutan”²⁸ and dispatched many spies to delude²⁹ in marginal Sichuan and Yunnan regions. Under this influence, Lama Gedansongzan in Zhongdian had plotted with Kukunaoer (Qinghai and Shuote Mongolia) and were involved in the revolt. Therefore, the boarder defensive situation at West became tensed suddenly, leaving southwestern regions the weak linkage of the boarder. In order to be initiative and prevent the situation like South Song Dynasty, Yongzheng and his subjects decided to bureaucratization of the native officers.

4.3 The Political Character Factor Analysis of Yongzheng and His Subjects

Emperor Yongzheng was a committed and hardworking master, who carried out the reform of eradicating the corrupt dealings during his reign. In *Yongzheng Bibliography*, Feng Erkang, the author, pointed out his innovative thoughts “rectifying the degenerate atmosphere for hundreds of years”. He regarded the reign of Yongzheng in these 13 years as:

He worked diligently every day and cherished all kinds of characteristic reform and policies so as to solve the long-standing maladministration, which had adapted to the development requirements to certain extent. All these help to the relevant transparent administration, promoting the prosperity of national strength, stability of the national political situation and the consolidation of multi-national country, thus he is a hardworking emperor who makes great contributions to the historical development. (Feng, 1985)

Mengsen has made the accounts of the reform by Yongzheng in detail, pointing out that: After the magnanimous treatment of the previous emperor, all the long-standing malpractices, once testified, should be eradicated... Among all the diligent emperors, no one can compare with Yingzhen.³⁰

However, Yongzheng was very irritable, so Kangxi had told him to be “patient and tolerated”. Under the dual requirements of political and military situations, Yongzheng had implemented the bureaucratization of

native officials as his ambitious political strategies. Therefore, the implementation of bureaucratization of native officials appeared to be in a rash, especially in “opening up Miao boarder” in Guizhou.

E. Ertai, a Juren (a successful candidate in the imperial examinations at the provincial level) and Xianglanqi people of Manchu, managed the affairs of bureaucratization; he worked as the official at jurisdiction ministry at the end of Kangxi period, and he was known for “being honest and upright as well as astute in politics”³¹, so he was favored by Yongzheng. After Yongzheng getting to the throne, E Ertai enjoyed a smooth term and often got promoted, so he needed to make some achievements to prove himself. Therefore, the political characters of Yongzheng and his subjects as well as the political situations at that time required them to make contributions so as to realize the political ideal of great unity.

During the period of Yongzheng, Qing Dynasty, the nationwide bureaucratization had been implemented in Qing Dynasty, which needed to adopt the strategies of “adjust measures according to local conditions” and “differential treatment”. To be specific, the bureaucratization of native officials in Guizhou regions can be divided into the general flow changing of chieftains and opening Miao Territory, in which the latter one stood the key point.

4.3.1 General Flow Changing of Chieftains

In early Yongzheng period, there was no general chieftain left in Guizhou region, for not only the four major chieftains but also many minor ones had been bureaucratism to change flows. During the 13 years of Yongzheng period, there were over 60 counties was reformed in Huguang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi and Guizhou; there were 36 in Huguang and only 7 Zhou in Guizhou (Zhang, 1980) for the chieftains above magistrates. All of them can be referred to *Qing Chronicles*:

On 6th April 1727, the Ministry of War replied after discussion:

He Shiji, inspector of Guizhou reported: Xue Shiqian, chieftain of Anshun office (belong to Zhenning State) had been dismissed for crimes; his son is too young to inherit, so Kangzuo ministry is divided into the magistracy of Zhenning State. If asked, just follow it.³²

On 27th April 1729, Yongzheng ordered Sizhai originally managed by chieftains in Zhongcao to be controlled by Guiyang government, subordinating to Shen Tingzhengqing, inspector of Guizhou.³³

On 29th January 1730, Yongzheng changed the area

²⁸ *Annals of Qing Dynasty History* (Yongzheng period), (2000, p.25, Beijing: China People's University Press.

²⁹ *A Royal Re-script with Red Ink. Gao Qizhuo Memorials*, Book 1, transcript preserved in Provincial Library of Guizhou, pp.43-45.

³⁰ *Teaching Materials of Ming and Qing Dynasty History* (1981) Volume 2, Chapter 3. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

³¹ Rongan, E. et al.: *Xiang Qin Bo E Wen Duan Gong Nian Pu*.

³² Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizong's Veritable Records* Book 54, pp.20-21.

³³ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizong's Veritable Records* Book 79, p.29-30.

managed by Hongfan chieftain to be controlled by Ding Fanzhou, subordinating to Zhang Guangsiqing, inspector of Guizhou.³⁴

4.3.2 Pacifying Miao People and Pioneering New Land

“Miao territory in Guizhou” (the contiguous area among Hunan, Guangxi and Yunnan). At the end of Ming Dynasty, although there were “construction of castles and troops stationing as well as blocking mountains and post road to prevent Miao people getting away” (Wang, 1991, October) and even “constructing city walls”, it was still a problem on how to establish an effective ruling in new Miao region. However, the previous “bureaucratization of native officers” before Yongzheng had laid the foundation for “Miao territory”. Qing government had set up many Weisuo near “Miao territory” and pioneered post roads for the sake of troops dispatching and delivering food for next stage; at the same time, Qing government can also get to know about the situations from the bureaucratism ethnic groups so as to associate or enlighten them to cooperate with the military actions of Qing government.

“Pioneering Miao territory” was implemented under the great background of large scaled bureaucratization of native officers; as one of the important links, it deserved to serve the general strategic goal of bureaucratization at this phase so as to ensure the smoothness of the road to Yunnan and Guizhou, which would also change the turbulent southwestern regions into the frontier combating West Mongolia. In fact, the new Miao territory was just located on the south line of main road to Yunnan and Guizhou, which directly related to the great situation whether Qing can safeguard Yunnan frontier. On the problem of pioneering Miao Territory in southeastern Guizhou, there had been a hot discussion on “pacifying or suppressing”³⁵ in Qing government: there were mainly three groups—“suppressing-favored” group represented by E Ertai and Zhang Guangsi, “pacifying-favored” group represented by Fang Xian (inspector of Zhenyuan officer, later promoted to the judicial commissioner of Guizhou) and “abandon” group represented by Gao Qizhuo (governor of Yunnan and Guizhou) and Zu Bingkui (inspector of Guangxi and Guizhou). They had different political views in this regard; besides, the corrupt dealings and internal infighting had made the overwhelming “pioneering Miao Territory” experience twists and turns dramatically.

The pioneering of Miao territory in southwestern Guizhou can be divided into the following phases: Changzhai War, Taizhou War and Taigong War. This pioneering served as the important part of the bureaucratization of native officers in Yongzheng period, which mainly aimed at ensure the smoothness of Yunnan-

Guizhou post road so as to support the attack of West Mongolia at frontier; at the same time, it was also the political method of Yongzheng to display his merciful virtue and ambitions. “Pioneering Miao Territory” didn’t calculate the cost accounting, which can be seen from the dialogue between Yongzheng and his father with his subjects:

In July, next year, E office will reported the pacifying situation of new Miao. He got the reply: There should be no haggling of their ‘interest’ in the new land; “money and food” shall not be spared. Bear in mind that doesn’t make mistakes because of trivial interests.³⁶

After twice thinking, I did not manage Miao territory for years, so the former Ningji had become futile. I have every thought for you and eradicate all those bad measures. So there won’t be any harvested land planted for civilians in mainland!³⁷

From “no emperor interfering and no controlling” to setting official systems, as well as household registration, although they represented a kind of social progress, the cultural differences between ethnic groups can hardly be avoided. “Qing military had stationed in Miao territory and their daily activities troubled their daily residence.”³⁸ In particular, building city walls, establishing offices, constructing forts and opening post roads had employed many Miao people for free; besides, there were all kinds of onerous taxation and apportions as well as extortion. Miao people could not tolerate this imposed and sudden exploitation and suppression, so their rebellious feeling kept going high, which finally led to the great revolt by Miao people in southeastern Guizhou in 1735 led by Baoli, etc..

In February 1735, Lipingrenbaoli had abused his power to expropriate money and food, so Miao people sought for a chance of revolt. He disseminated the wood carving and claimed that he knew magic skills, so a group of 20,000 people was soon gathered, occupying Little Danjiang and Qingxi, etc.. They defended the officials and militants and blocked their way to deliver food. Therefore, there was a lack of food in Danjiang, Taigong, Qingjiang and Bazhai at the same time. The government troops were terror-stricken by the brave Miao people. Ha Yuansheng on the west line found that the more militants there were, the more they needed to employ. Dong Fang on the east line took a watch-and-see attitude and took no action. Zhang Zhao, who pacified Miao territory, forewent it and retreated back to the mainland. There had been a contentious discussions among the subjects: E. Ertai, the grand secretary, and Zhang Guangsi, governor of

³⁴ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Shizong's Veritable Records* Book 89, p. 21.

³⁵ (Qing) Fang Xian. *Ping Miao Ji Lue* Tongzhi block-printed edition in Wuchang.

³⁶ *A Royal Re-script with Red Ink of Yongzheng*, Imperial Collection of Four edition.

³⁷ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 52, pp.14-27.

³⁸ *The Archives of Miaomin Insurrection in Early Qing Dynasty* (1987, the first volume, p.163). Beijing: Guangming Daily Press.

Huguang wrote to apologize for their bad management at that time, and Yongzheng emperor also passed away in worry and anger. When Qianlong got to the throne, he re-deployed in order to turn the situation; he appointed Zhang Guangsi who was familiar with the affairs in Miao territory as Jinglv (official position above governor) as well as the inspector of Guizhou, fully responding for the suppressing in Miao territory. After he got there, he adopted double-strategy: suppressing while pacifying; disintegrate and demoralize “new Miao” and “old Miao”. From June to September, many Miao houses in Taigong, Kaili, Qingping, Huangping and Shibing on both banks of Qingshui river had been fired for nothing. The revolt by Miao people in southeastern Guizhou had finally been put down.

5. REHABILITATION OF MIAO TERRITORY BY QINGLONG EMPEROR

After pacifying the affairs in Miao territory, Qinglong Emperor, adopting the previous experience, proceeded with a circumspect attitude and made certain concessions to Miao people. On 15th August 1736, Qinglong elucidated his general plan for managing Miao territory in one edict:

Zhang Guangsi, governor disseminated the edict and exempt the money and food forever in Guizhou.... The customs of Miao people are different from those of mainland civilians, so the disputes of Miao people are settled by their regulations instead of sending to government. The cases involving militants and Miao people are dealt with by civil officials or military officers in a just way for fear of troubling the local people.³⁹

Qing government allowed the internal disputes of the newly developed Miao territory be solved by the customary laws of Miao people and exempted them from taxation, which was earned by taking a heavy toll of the uprisings of Miao people. This had also made Qing rulers more aware of the fact that the direct legal control and taxation would easily lead to their rebellions. Therefore, under the guiding thoughts of safeguarding the social stability of the boarder, Qing government had adopted a series of special regulations and measures.

Firstly, living with Miao people was forbidden. In August 1739, Zhang Guangsi, governor of Guizhou reported: If Miao and Han people live together, it may lead to bullying.⁴⁰

In June, 1755, Sun Ying, judicial commissioner of Guizhou reported:

The Miao people in new land are simpler than the previous land. There all kinds of illicit dealings: traitors, instigations in Miao houses, expropriation of Miao land for a long time and seduce thefts; any of them happened should be returned to original

places; only in this way can such moth be eradicated and settle Miao people.⁴¹

Secondly, purchasing and establishing were prohibited in the new area by Han people.

In April 1750, Ai Bi, inspector of Guizhou, replied: The local officers are ordered to scrutinize the Miao houses in new land which was only after bureaucratization; Han people are forbidden to purchase properties or hide in other places. They got the edict: act as discussion result.⁴²

Thirdly, the horse dealers were prohibited to enter the Miao boarder.

In June 1751, Kaitai, inspector of Guizhou reported:

The discussion result of today is that three offices: Duyun, Liping, Nanlong; 11 halls: Changzhai, Langdai, Bazhai, Tiagong, Songtao, Guzhou, Guihua, Danjiang, Dujiang, Qingjiang and Shuicheng; three states: Dingfan, Dushan and Yongzhou; two counties: Libo and Yongcong; Duyun belonging to Duyun county as well Liping belonging to Kaitai county---are all the key regions of Miao territory, so the horse dealing is strongly forbidden.⁴³

The implementation of this policy was initially to stabilize the border society, which also in fact protected the Miao civilians when they exchanged with Han people. The special control policy in Miao boarder was historically rational at that time. At the end of Qing Dynasty, the customary laws of the ethnic groups had been in continuous conflicts and concord. Although Qianlong had exempted Miao territories of money and food as well as fully respected their customs, there was no complete implementation; it was a great step of progress to restrain heavy exploitation. In order to consolidate the control in Miao territory, emperor Qinglong had established 6 offices (i.e. Bazhai office, Dujiang Office, Danjiang office, Qingjiang office, Guzhou office and Taigong office), on the basis of which he also set up “Langdong camp in the second year of his reign” and “Xiajiang office” (Ren, 1987). He did not only support the former chieftains, but also resumed the offices of those dismissed ones to manage the local affairs. In addition, Qing government also dispatched chieftain generals in the area with most uprisings of Miao people, or bases, or the ones conflicting with Qing army or the dangerous places wiping out Qing army. All these generals were the descendants of those chieftains who made contributions in suppressing the local militants or those who were familiar with the local situation of Miao territory, allowing heredity to manage the local affairs.

Up till now, the bureaucratization of native officials dominated by the central government had basically come to an end. Although the bureaucratization of native officers

³⁹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 22, pp.20-22.

⁴⁰ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 99, p.36.

⁴¹ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 689, p.4.

⁴² Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 363, pp.30-32.

⁴³ Qing Dynasty Records. *Qing Dynasty Gaozong's Veritable Records* Book 397, pp.34-35.

didn't realize the complete changes of Guizhou region into landlord system from chieftain system, there were still many old systems constraining the social productivity existing in Guizhou society. For example, "48 systems" still exerted a large influence after Shuixi region being bureaucratism; the management system of flowing officers could not be implemented smoothly, for "chieftains have been bureaucratized, but old systems dominate"⁴⁴. The local officers conspired with chieftains to exploit local civilians and guests. "Local people all blame for the dotted old systems like local rules (Ai, 1992), so there are often thefts and homicide". However, as a main body of the system, the chieftain system had withered away. Guizhou, the research subject of this paper, had finally formed the current political situations with the formation of Zunyi office on 3rd September 1728. By the end of Qing Dynasty, there were 12 offices in Guizhou: Guiyang, Shiqian, Anshun, Xingyi, Dading, Zunyi, Liping, Sinan, Sizhou, Zhenyuan, Tongren and Duyun; one Zhili state: Pingyue and one Zhili legacy of office: Songtao. Guiyang serves as the cap (Niu, 1990).

CONCLUSION

The bureaucratization of native officers, an objective reflection of south and east warding Chinese civilizations, represents the top-down and center-marginal expansion and strong publication of Han civilization, which makes Guizhou region one of the logistical bases of China warding off the foreign offenses. It is aimed at assimilating cultures and constructing the unified country with multiple nationalities (Sun, 2007). The attitude responding to this dissemination of the former Chieftain-dominated regions of Guizhou in the disadvantageous development of culture depends on the specific manner in implementing the bureaucratization of native officers. It is the exchanges, acculturation, conflicts and fusions of Han civilizations represented by the central government and the civilizations in marginal regions that the pluralistic integration patterns of ethnic groups can be realized.

Throughout the whole Qing Dynasty, there had been great twists and changes of the bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou area—with the changes in military and political situations, it had gone through several different policy periods of appeasement in Shunzhi period, the active flow-changing of Wu Sangui, resumption of conciliatory policy in Kangxi period, the comprehensive and all-dimensional native officers bureaucratization in Yongzheng period and the policy rehabilitation of

Koreans, Miao nationalities and frontier in Qing Dynasty. As the important strategic pivot, the policy changes of bureaucratization of native officers in Guizhou stands for an epitome for the minority policy at borders under the domination of central regime for the great unity, the changing reasons of which are not only closely related with the objective military and political situations, but also related with the ruling styles of the emperors themselves. The national strategies of the mainland-frontier integration of Qing Dynasty were constant; the phased policy changes of bureaucratization of native officers were only different in manners and measures. It is just in this phased changes and gradually forwarding process that the bureaucratization of Guizhou realized the general goal of matching politics, economics and culture with the mainland.

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⁴⁴ (Qing) Huang Zhaizhong. *Yu Tu Mu*. see Daoguang *Da Ding Fu Zhi* Book 59, *Wen Zheng Jiu*.